The Cognition of the "I" in Phenomenology

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree "Doctor of Philosophy", Haifa University, 1998

Abstract

Our basic problem, that is the reason for the current research, in based of the following fact: The development of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method led him gradually from a denial of the existence of a "pure ego" in his first major work, "Logical Investigations" (1901-2), to a self-evident, principle acknowledgment of that same Subject in his second major work, "Ideen" (1913). Husserl believed that this change is an important result of the systematic change of the phenomenological method on its way to become "Transcendental Phenomenology". For us, however, this belief of Husserl poses a problem, and therefore, we content that in order to arrive at a satisfactory evaluation of this belief, we have to examine to what extent the phenomenological cognition of the "I" in Phenomenology is based on sound phenomenological-epistemological foundations.

Our basic hypothesis is twofold:

1. That major ambiguities in Phenomenology as a whole must be based on epistemological ambivalences that are found already in Husserl's fundamental work, "Logical Investigations" and are aggravated in his "Ideas".
2. That the problems inherent in the phenomenological cognition of the "I" are unsolvable, as long as these basic epistemological problems are left unclarified.

We come to the following main conclusions:

1. That Husserl's basic achievements, after critical scrutiny and clarification, prove to be of real value to further phenomenological epistemology, provided that we are able to correct some of his mistaken assumptions as well as transform and improve some of his basic phenomenological cognitive practices.
2. That these achievements, transformed in this way, can both sustain Husserl general claim to have found a "eidetic" method of cognitive research, as well as, if applied to the cognitive problems of the "I", can sustain Husserl general claim to have discovered a testable and reasonable knowledge process of a "pure 'I''.

And in greater detail:

The first four chapters deals with the basic epistemological foundations of phenomenology.

The first chapter is entitled: The Foundations of the Knowledge Theory of Phenomenology. This chapter undertakes a close examination of the concept of "Intentionality" and its significance for the phenomenological theory of knowledge as a whole. Husserl took Brenatno's concept, differentiated and widened its scope, and adopted it in order to include new phenomenological distinctions. The new formulation of this conception in Husserl's phenomenological investigations is then considered, pointing out its most significant achievements, but also the different interpretations afforded by Husserl himself to these basic concepts in the course of his own phenomenological development. A fundamental difficulty emerges, that indicates the possibility of an epistemological one-sidedness in Husserl's conception of the act of cognition, that shall have stark consequences for his conception of the cognitive process and nature of the "I".  The basic critical judgement to emerge in this study is that Husserl  tended, as time went on, to overemphasize the "intuitively perceived", sense-perceptible presence of the object of the meaning intention, as the main condition for evidential cognition of meaning, while emphasizing less and less the "noetic" concept formation process and its role in the determination of the "given" sensual or eidetic content of perception. This one-sidedness might explain the reason for the sudden and somewhat dogmatic presentation of the concept of "the principle of all principles" of phenomenological theory of knowledge given in the "Ideas".   

The second chapter is entitled: The Essence of Intentionality.

Here we undertake a study of the concept of "evidence" in pure thought acts, in the sphere of adequate inner perception. We strive to redefine this act and to recreate a knowledge-theoretical foundation for philosophical interpretation of Phenomenology as whole, conceived as "pure", "eidetic" or "transcendental" Phenomenology. However, we show that Husserl has left abundant space for ambiguous (mis)interpretation, and we try to amend for this lack by introducing new phenomenological distinctions to characterize the evidential act of cognition.

The third chapter try to reenact Husserl's key cognitive practice, considered by him to be the very essence of the phenomenological method, namely, the practice of "phenomenological variation". This method leads, according to Husserl's contention, to the development of a new cognitive capacity, that enable a "seeing" of essences (actualized general concepts and ideas). This theme of "phenomenological seeing" must, however, be problematized, because, while not studied as a major theme in the "Investigations", it is presented as a matter of self-evident fact of cognition in the "Ideas". Our critical point of view, started in chapters 1-2, is enlarged here, as well as in the next chapter.

The fourth chapter investigate in greater detail the central epistemological concept of "truth" and "evidence", that form the main subject of the fundamental sixth investigation in the second volume of "Logical Investigations". At the end of our examination we gather together the positive new advancements made by Husserl in comparison with the major traditional conceptions of cognitive truth and point to the above-mentioned limitations of his conception, and some of its consequences for Husserl's ambiguous concept of the "I".

Chapter five is entitled: The development of the concept of the "I". This chapter undertakes a critical epistemological analysis and interpretation of Husserl's changing and many-leveled description of his phenomenological findings in regard to the concept of the "I", "ego" or "Subject". Husserl begins with a wholesale denial of the existence of a "pure ego" in his first book and ends with the affirmation of "absolute transcendental subjectivity" in his later works, a process that places the conception of the "pure I" of the "Ideas" in a key developmental position. Therefore, we concentrate specifically on the description of the "pure 'I'" in volumes I and II of "Ideas". We show some of the main difficulties and ambiguities that underlay them and point out the reason for their existence. At the end we offer a possible "way out" by showing that Husserl constantly mixed together two main approaches to the problem of the cognition of the "I": The more Cartesian way, that we believe to be leading him again and again astray, and his own independent  phenomenological method, that struggle to emerge and clarify its truly significant new contribution to the philosophy of cognition as a whole.

Chapter six is entitled: The essence of the cognizing "I". It concludes with an independent construction of a phenomenological concept of a "pure I", based on our interpretation and transformation of Husserl's fundamental knowledge-theoretical concepts and cognitive phenomenological practices.